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  Linguistic and cultural differences, different legal and supervisory frameworks, and relationship 
lending have been repeatedly mentioned as barriers to European retail banking integration. We 
investigate whether these barriers have affected integration within national boundaries, using an 
index of localism of regional banking systems as a measure of market integration. If local banks are 
established and flourish because asymmetric information makes entry difficult for non-incumbents 
(Dell’Ariccia, 2001) or regulatory and governance rules prevent entry from outside (Berger et al., 
1995), we should find a significant relationship between indicators of these barriers and measures of 
the localism of banking systems. Our results show that this is indeed the case for asymmetric 
information, while findings are more blurred for supervisory practices. 
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The nature of European banking systems and the prospects for their integration have received 
much academic and institutional attention over the last decade or so since the launch of the Single 
Market Programme, the inception of the Economic and Monetary Union and the transition to the 
Euro.
2 A substantial consensus has been reached that small corporate and retail banking markets are 
far from being fully integrated across Europe. Available evidence supporting this conclusion seems 
to  be  robust  across  different  measures  of  integration  (Adam  et  al.,  2002).  As  summarized  by 
Degryse-Ongena (2004), the “European banking market should be open for business for all banks 
chartered in the European Union [..]. In practice, things are not that simple as both exogenous and 
endogenous economic borders remain formidable barriers”.  
Factors that contribute to the segmentation of the European retail banking market have been 
alternatively  called  borders  or  barriers  and  include  such  different  phenomena  as  linguistic  and 
cultural differences, relationship lending, corporate governance rules, and supervisory and lending 
practices (e.g. ECB, 1999 and 2000; the papers in Artis et al., 2000; Degryse-Ongena, 2004). A 
distinction is often drawn between barriers due to asymmetric information (linguistic differences, 
lending relationship) and those due to legal and regulatory provisions (Buch, 2003). The concept of 
barriers remains comprehensive, however, and the jury is still out on which factors are prominent in 
hampering retail banking market integration in Europe. 
In this paper, we evaluate the role of these different barriers across the continent by examining 
banking systems in 147 European regions. On the one hand, the regional perspective provides some 
distinct  advantages,  as  we  argue  in  detail  in  the  next  paragraph.  Among  other,  within-country 
characteristics that have survived national integrations, and are now centuries old, are also the most 
likely to survive European integration. On the other hand, this sub-national focus forces us, because 
of data availability, to rely on a quantity-based indicator of financial integration that, as such, lacks a 
                                                 
1 We would like to thank, for help and comments, two anonymous referees, Riccardo De Bonis, Ron Martin, Marcello 
Messori,  Marcello  Pagnini,  Miria  Rocchelli,  Luigi  Federico  Signorini  and  participants  at  the  seminar  held  at  the 
Research Department of the Bank of Italy (June 2005), at the XIV International “Tor Vergata” Conference on Banking 
and Finance (Rome, December 2005) and at the conference on “The Changing Geography of Banking” held at the 
Università Politecnica delle Marche (Ancona, September 2006). The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily 
reflect those of the Bank of Italy.  
2 For example, the European Central Bank is now publishing an annual report on the EU banking structure and has co-
launched a research network on capital markets and financial integration in Europe (ECB, 2004, provides a summary of 
the findings so far).   4 
clear theoretical underpinning. However, as the most comprehensive study, to our knowledge, on the 
measures  of  capital  market  integration  in  the  European  Union  (Adam  et  al.,  2002)  recognizes, 
quantity-based indicators (e.g. the share of foreign banks over the total number of banks) may have 
some  informative  content.  According  to  Pagano  (2002),  “[w]e  should  stress  that  we  look  at 
quantities despite the fact that the law of one price has nothing to say about them. Nevertheless, we 
feel that these measures are of interest. In a system with no financial barriers, the domicile of assets 
issuers and holders should play a decreasing role over time.” 
In this perspective, we verify whether different barriers have a significant effect on an index of 
localism of regional banking systems that bears several similarities to the quantity-based measures 
just mentioned. The logic underlying our paper is similar to Buch’s (2003): while she shows how 
lower barriers (achieved through either deregulation or reduction of information costs) induce higher 
international asset holdings, we look at whether lower barriers are associated, across regions, with a 
lower degree of localism of the regional banking system.  
To determine the expected impact of barriers on our index of localism we draw on the existing 
literature,  as  explained  in  more  detail  in  the  next  paragraph.  For  barriers  due  to  asymmetric 
information, we refer to the papers by Dell’Ariccia (2001), Marquez (2002) and Hauswald-Marquez 
(2006), which show that informational asymmetries may shape the industry structure, favouring 
incumbents.  For  regulatory  barriers,  several  papers  (e.g.  Berger  et  al.,  1995;  Jayaratne-Strahan, 
1996; Mishkin, 1996) underline the relevant effects triggered in the United States by the lifting of 
restrictions on both interstate and within-state branching. 
We complement this analysis with an investigation of cross-border branching among all regions 
in our sample. While a cross-border analysis has some well-known limits and branching may not be 
the favourite way for a bank to go abroad, especially when asymmetric information is relevant, we 
believe that, precisely for the latter reason, this analysis may be useful to cross-check our results and 
possibly grasp the role, if any, of specific factors operating cross-border.  
The plan of the paper is as follows: in the next paragraph, we illustrate our approach, while 
in  paragraph  3  we  describe  our  methodology.  Paragraph  4  reviews  data  sources  and  some 




   5 
2. Why do we focus on regional banking structures? 
Our approach is somewhat novel and has to be motivated in detail, with regard to both the 
relationship between barriers and our quantity-based measure of integration (the degree of localism 
of a banking system) and the focus on regional data. 
Recent  papers  by  Dell’Ariccia  (2001),  Marquez  (2002)  and  Hauswald-Marquez  (2006) 
provide a convenient framework to understand the relationship between informational barriers and 
local banking structures. As incumbent banks gather information about borrowers through lending, 
they have an informational advantage over new entrants (Broecker, 1990; Sharpe, 1990; Petersen-
Rajan, 1994; Shaffer, 1998). This informational asymmetry generates endogenous fixed costs for the 
potential entrants, which represent a barrier to entry in the banking industry. Dell’Ariccia (2001) 
shows that differences in endogenous costs increase with the degree of asymmetric information 
among  banks  and  this  could  explain  why  financial  institutions  have  limited  their  cross-border 
activities to wholesale banking as the “informational costs” per dollar lent are presumably lower in 
that segment of the market. In his words, “deregulation [..] is more likely to induce entry on those 
segment  of  the  market  where  asymmetric  information  is  less  important  [..]  Evidence  from  the 
European Union confirms this view [..] retail markets have remained concentrated and dominated by 
domestic banks”. The lower share of foreign banks in “universal bank” countries is consistent with 
the idea that entry is more difficult in markets where the institutional framework allows incumbent 
banks to acquire pervasive information about their clients (Steinherr-Huveneers, 1994). In this vein, 
we argue that a testable implication of these theoretical models are that regional markets where 
asymmetric information is more pervasive should have a prevalence of local banks (incumbents). In 
paragraph 3, we tackle the issue of how to define these variables for our empirical exercise. 
Similarly, the survival of small local banks should have been favoured by tighter regulation, 
especially given the strong trend towards consolidation affecting banking systems across Europe.
3 
Regulatory  barriers  may  take,  for  istance,  the  form  of  different  legal  provisions  or  regulatory 
requirements for different types of banks. We assume that, ceteris paribus, our proxy for regulatory 
barriers (described in detail in paragraph 3) is positively related to an  index of localism of the 
banking system.  
                                                 
3 From January 1999 to January 2003, the number of banks in the euro area diminished from 9,802 to 8,538, falling in all 
countries but Finland. In Italy, for example, the number of banks fell by more than 200 between January 1990 and 
January 1999 and by more than 100 between that date and January 2003.    6 
A  second  characteristic  of  this  paper  is  the  use  of  regional  data,  which  we  believe  is 
particularly  suitable  for  our  goals  on  several  grounds.  First,  most  factors  that  are  frequently 
mentioned as barriers can probably be better investigated at a regional level. Consider, for example, 
the  idea  that  a  matching  of  small  firms  and  local  banks  may  occurs  endogenously  in  banking 
systems, as only small local banks can process the “soft” information that would characterize the 
small firms. The idea of a matching of the size of banks and the size of firms in an economy – due to 
information asymmetries – is not new and it has been backed by some evidence (e.g. Angeloni et al., 
1995; Cetorelli, 2001; Petersen-Rajan, 2002; Berger et al., 2003), although, as far as we know, it has 
not been explored for EU regions.  In looking  at this issue, a local focus of the analysis seems 
appropriate, as a higher level of aggregation could cancel out within-country variability.  
Similar considerations apply to linguistic and cultural differences, which are often mentioned 
as an important obstacle to cross-border activity in Europe. In the EU-15 countries, not less than 
eleven official languages are spoken, meaning that linguistic dummies are hardly distinguishable 
from a country fixed-effect in a cross-country panel regression.
4 At a regional level, instead, we can 
control for country fixed-effects while taking advantage of the existence of a non-negligible number 
of regions (about 10% of our sample) with linguistic minorities. If linguistic differences are such a 
serious issue as to require separate financial institutions for different linguistic communities, we 
should expect regions with linguistic minorities to have, ceteris paribus, a larger number of local 
banks. 
A second reason for our sub-national focus is that the resilience of local characteristics may 
be more safely assumed at a regional level. In fact, European economic integration is still very much 
a work in progress, all the more so when compared with unifications within European countries that 
took place centuries ago. In a similar vein, Guiso et al. (2004) noted that as Italy “has been unified, 
from  both  a  political  and  a  regulatory  point  of  view,  for  the  last  140  years  […]  the  level  of 
integration reached within Italy probably represents an upper bound for the level of integration 
international financial markets can reach”. In other words, regional characteristics have already been 
largely tested by national integration and it is reasonable to assume that they will also prove resilient 
to European integration. The same presumption might not apply in a European perspective where 
local is often meant to refer to national characteristics. 
                                                 
4 It is customary to refer to the fifteen countries that were already EU members prior to the May 2004 enlargement as 
EU-15 countries.   7 
Finally, a regional analysis allows the inclusion of country fixed-effects in our regressions, 
something  that  cross-country  exercise  comparing  banking  structures  can  hardly  omit  without 
incurring in a serious bias. 
 
3. Methodology  
3.1. An analysis of regional banking systems 
Our general specification is as follows: 
Yrc = f (Xrc ; Zc) 
where r and c are indexing respectively regions and countries.  
We chose as our dependent variable the ratio between total banks and total branches for each 
European region, arguing that this ratio, which is bounded between zero and one by construction,
5 is 
a good indicator of the degree of localism of a regional banking system.  
To understand why, consider, first, the case in which the ratio is equal to one in a region. 
This means that in that region there are no branches from outside and all the credit institutions 
incorporated in that region have just one branch, being local almost by definition. 
Next, consider the case in which the index is equal to zero. This lower bound will be reached 
only in those  regions where no banks are incorporated, whatever the number of branches from 
outside regions. This is not only a reasonable representation, from an abstract point of view, of a 
system with no local components, it also reflects the actual situation of banking systems in some 
European regions.  
Between the lower and upper bounds, the index will be smaller the larger the number of 
branches present in a region with respect to the number of banks incorporated there. As we cannot 
distinguish between branches owned by credit institutions established outside or inside the region, 
the ratio could also take on low values when a regional banking system is dominated by a very large 
regional bank. Although this is an unappealing feature of our index, it is less of a nuisance than one 
might  expect  as  several  contributions,  both  empirical  and  theoretical  (e.g.  Berger  et  al.,  2001; 
Petersen-Rajan, 2002; Berger-Udell, 2002; Degryse-Ongena, 2004; Hauswald-Marquez, 2006), note 
that the characteristics typically associated with local banks depend on distance, suggesting that a 
                                                 
5 As our index is bounded between 0 and 1, we use a fractional logit regression model (e.g. Papke-Wooldridge, 1996) 
that fits naturally within our setting.   8 
large regional bank located some distance away from its branches may not be as local as a unit 
credit institution. 
In particular, Berger-Udell (2002) note that large local banks may be less keen to engage in 
relationship  lending  because  they  are  headquartered  at  a  considerable  distance  from  potential 
relationship customers and this aggravates the problems associated with transmitting soft, locally-
based relationship information to senior bank management. In a similar vein, Berger et al. (2001) 
note that bank holding companies may have problems in controlling small banks that are located far 
from  their  headquarters,  consistent  with  the  idea  that  relationship  lending  may  become  more 
difficult  as  distance  increases.  Ferri  (1997)  shows  how  turnover  of  branch  managers  (typically 
adopted by large banks and clearly not applying to unit credit institutions) may have been used in 
Italy as a mechanism to control collusions between them and borrowers, with the side effect of 
hampering the development of lending relationships in large banks.  
Moreover, although DeYoung-Goldberg-White (1999) found that no systematic relationship 
exists between number of branches and propensity to lend to small firms,
6 their finding has to be 
qualified by noting that “when assets (that are strongly correlated with the number of branches) are 
excluded from the specification, the coefficient on the number of branches became negative and 
statistically significant” (p. 480). This suggests that bank size affects propensity to lend to small 
firms and that, in this perspective, the fact that our index differentiates between large and small local 
banks (as banking systems characterized by the prevalence of unit credit institutions have a greater 
value of the ratio than regional systems with few large banks) may be a favourable feature. 
Finally, one may wonder whether our index of localism really bears some relationship to the 
degree of integration within national boundaries. To provide at least tentative evidence on this point, 
we compute a rank correlation between the percentage change in the number of banks in our sample 
period (October 1998-December 2003) and our index to check whether systems with a stronger local 
component are in fact less prone to mergers (including those out-of-the-market that are a possible 
way to achieve integration). The correlation has the expected positive sign (i.e. banking systems 
with a stronger local component “lost” fewer banks) with a coefficient of 0.18, significant at the 5% 
level. The correlation is also robust to outliers as size and significance of the correlation remain 
pretty much unchanged if we exclude the top and bottom deciles of the distribution.  
                                                 
6 This result was flagged by a referee.    9 
Covariates are defined either at regional (Xrc) or country (Zc) level. We include in our list of 
variables all the factors that could affect either demand or supply of banking services. Our list of 
potential variables includes the following:
7 
Xrc  =  {populationrc,  GDP  per  capitarc,  firm  sizerc,  dummy  for  linguistic  minoritiesrc,  number  of 
workers employed in agriculturerc, students/populationrc, R&Drc, dummy for the region of the 
country capitalrc, roads’ length/ surface arearc, weight of service sectorrc};  
Zc = {supervision practices indexesc, share of assets held by government-owned banks in 1995c and 
in 2003 c, country fixed effectsc}. 
Our interest is focused on four regressors: i) firms’ size, as a proxy for barriers relating to 
asymmetric information and relevance of relationship lending; ii) a dummy for linguistic minorities, 
as a proxy for linguistic and cultural barriers; iii) indexes of supervisory practices as a proxy for 
regulatory barriers; and iv) the share of total assets held by government-owned banks, as a proxy for 
possible legal barriers. Remaining covariates are basically included as controls.
8  
We expect the first variable to be negatively related to our dependent variable, while the 
remaining  variables  should  be  positively  related.  We  summarize  the  degree  of  asymmetric 
information  in  the  borrower-lender  relationship  with  the  average  firm  size,  in  line  with  a  vast 
literature on this topic (already reviewed in previous paragraphs), claiming that services to small 
firms are likely to be provided by small banking institutions. A more skeptical view on this issue has 
been  taken  recently  by  Berger-Udell  (2006):  they  suggest  that  the  received  view  that  financial 
structures have to include a substantial market share for small institutions to meet the demand of 
opaque  SMEs  could be  outdated due to  new transaction technologies.  However,  there  is  still  a 
widely  held  opinion,  backed  by  some  evidence,  that  not  only  “..the  impact  of  technology  on 
informational borders is unclear a priori from a theoretical point of view. But Europe further faces 
                                                 
7 Given the potential for multicollinearity, we check correlations among variables (e.g. share of employees in agriculture 
and  GDP  per  capita)  and  we  perform  standard  tests  (e.g.  variance  inflation  factor)  to  detect  any  problem  with 
multicollinearity.  
8 The inclusion of most of them is self-explanatory. The impact of the share of students is ex-ante debatable. It could 
indicate a weaker current demand, as typically students do not demand a significant amount of banking products, but 
also a higher prospective demand if returns to schooling are sizeable. We also add a dummy for the region of the country 
capital to control for the fact that is where some banks (typically foreign ones) tend to locate their headquarters. National 
and regional differences seem to be properly accounted for by our variables. Residuals for each European region from a 
log-linear regression do not show any systematic pattern. The comprehensive set of regional variables - Xrc - should 
mitigate the risk of omitted regional variables, although we cannot control for regional effects. However, we lack data 
on within-country differences in regulatory and legal systems, if any. We believe that this could actually be an issue only   10 
specific problems when it comes to reducing informational asymmetries. Hardening of information, 
for example, could in principle alleviate some of the informational asymmetries. But hardening of 
information may also be more problematic in Europe than in the USA as it is not clear that all the 
information that is already hardened is equally reliable across Europe” (Degryse-Ongena, 2004). 
In order to handle the possible endogeneity of firm size (e.g. Demirgüc-Kunt-Maksimovic, 
1998; Shan et al. 2001; Allen et al., 2005) we also employ instrumental variables (IV) estimators.
9 
We use instruments for firms’ size that satisfy two conditions: (i) they are suggested by the literature 
(Kumar  et  al.,  1999  provide  a  useful  review)  and  (ii)  they  are  available  at  a  regional  level. 
Accordingly, we select three instruments: R&D (the number, in log scale, of patent applications to 
the European Patent Office by firms in each region), the weight of the service sector (the share of 
employees in the tertiary in each region), and the infrastructure endowment (the ratio between the 
length of regional roads and the regional surface area).  
 
3.2. Cross-border branching  
To  complement  the  exercise  described  in  the  previous  paragraph,  we  also  test  the 
determinants of cross-border branching across European regions. It is broadly recognized in the 
literature that this is not the only way for foreign banks to enter a national market (e.g. Focarelli-
Pozzolo, 2001) and there are some claims that branching is probably not the preferred one when 
information asymmetries are large (e.g. Dell’Ariccia, 2001). Precisely for this reason, an analysis of 
cross-border branching may shed some further light on the size of the barriers we are investigating. 
In other words, we expect that the role of informational barriers should be magnified in this kind of 
exercise. 
The dependent variable here is the number of foreign branches established in each region by 
banks from every other foreign region of our sample. Therefore, in this exercise we have a much 
larger number of observations, even if zeros are predominant.  
Count data models are a natural choice for this exercise as standard linear models ignore the 
discrete and non-negative nature of dependent variables and the heteroskedasticity inherent in count 
data (Winkelmann, 2003). In order to account for the excess zeros in the sample, we use a two-step 
                                                                                                                                                                   
in the case of Germany where the federal structure leaves some degree of autonomy to Länder. We repeat our regression 
excluding Germany without any significant difference in our results. 
9 We carry out both fractional logit and IV regressions in order to exploit the merits of both methodologies.   11 
model, known as Zero Inflated Poisson model.
10 In the first step, a binary probability logit model 
determines the probability of a zero outcome; in the second step, a Poisson distribution describes the 
positive  outcomes.  As in  the  previous  exercise,  we  carry  out  an  IV  estimate  to  control  for  the 
possible presence of endogeneity.
11 
The set of independent variables is slightly different from our previous exercise. We include 
three different categories of variables that describe respectively some characteristics of the host and 
the home region (or country) and their links. For the host regions, we use the same set of covariates 
as in the previous exercises. For the home region, we include country dummies and regional GDP 
per capita. The third set of regressors includes variables linking each pair of regions: trade flows 
between their countries; measures (drawn from Guiso et al., 2004) of the reciprocal trust between 
the  citizens  of  the  host  country  and  those  of  the  foreign  bank’s  country;  and  three  dummies: 
existence of a common language between each pair of regions (or, in alternative, country), a dummy 
for common borders between countries and a dummy for common borders between regions. 
 
4. Data sources  
This work relies on both regional and national data across Europe. We assemble data on the 
number of banks and branches, and on a large set of real economy and structural data, in 147 regions 
across Europe, covering all the regions in the EU-15 countries except Luxemburg and Sweden due 
to  some  missing  data.  Regions  are  identified  using  the  NUTS2  territorial  breakdown  (with  the 
exception of Germany and the UK, where the NUTS1 level – Laender and Regions – has been 
used).
12  The following  countries  are  included  in  the dataset:  Austria  (9  regions),  Belgium  (11), 
Denmark  (1),  Finland  (5),  France  (22),  Germany  (16),  Greece  (13),  Ireland  (2),  Italy  (20), 
Netherlands (12), Portugal (7), Spain (17), United Kingdom (12).
13 Our sample therefore includes 
                                                 
10 See Lambert (1992); and Gobbi-Lotti (2003) for a recent application on Italian banking data.  
11 In this case, too, since IV techniques have not been developed, to our knowledge, for the Zero Inflated Poisson model, 
we adopt a log transformation of data after adding a small positive constant to each count, due to the presence of a great 
number of zeros. 
12 NUTS is the French acronym for Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics. It was defined by Eurostat more than 
two decades ago to provide a single uniform breakdown of territorial units for the production of regional statistics for the 
European Union. For details, see europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/ramon/nuts/introduction_regions_en.html. 
13 We do not consider six regions that are usually included in the NUTS2 breakdown but that are geographically 
separated from the mainland. They are the four French départements d'outre-mer and the two Spanish enclaves in North-
Africa (Ceuta and Melilla). We also consider jointly the two autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano in Italy that 
are separately coded in NUTS2.    12 
11 euro area countries and 2 EU countries not belonging to the euro area. Table 1 lists the countries 
and regions included in our sample. 
The number of credit institutions in each region is drawn from national data included in the 
List of Monetary Financial Institutions for five dates (October 1998, June and December 2002, June 
and December 2003).
14 We map banks to their region of establishment using postal codes as a key. 
The number of branches of credit institutions in each European region is drawn from the regional 
database  Regio,  maintained  by  Eurostat.  The  same  source  also provides  data on regional  GDP, 
number of firms, firms’ size, R&D (number of patent applications), number of employees in the 
agricultural sector, industry and services, households’ disposable income, surface areas, population, 
education (number of students), transport (number of vehicles and motorways). We collect annual 
data from 1996 to 2001, where available. Data on linguistic minorities are inferred from the “Report 
on the linguistic rights of persons belonging to national minorities in the OSCE area” published by 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE, 1999). Table 2 reports the regions 
identified as linguistic and cultural minority areas. 
Three indexes of supervisory practices are taken from Barth et al. (2006) and are based on a 
cross-country database on Bank Regulation and Supervision, originally maintained by the World 
Bank. The database collects the answers of many supervision authorities around the world to a set of 
questions on regulatory issues.
15 The values of the three indexes for each country are reported in 
Table 3. The three indexes summarize the restrictiveness of supervision by defining, respectively, 
the scope of credit institutions’ activities (e.g. if they are allowed to deal with securities, to sell 
insurance, etc.), as the attractiveness of entry into a national market may depend on this aspect; the 
set of  general supervisory  powers; and the  rules applied to entry.  While the latter index seems 
clearly the most relevant for the issues dealt with in this paper and it properly focuses on questions 
dealing with both ex-ante rules and effective outcomes, it has some distinctive weaknesses because 
some of the questions are not answered by all the European countries and formal rules for entry are 
basically  defined at European level. As a  check  for  robustness, we include alternatively  all the 
indexes in our regressions. 
                                                 
14 The Monetary Financial Institutions - MFIs - are central banks, resident credit institutions as defined in Community 
law, and other resident financial institutions whose business is to receive deposits and/or close substitutes for deposits 
from entities other than MFIs and, for their own account (at least in economic terms), to grant credits and/or make 
investments in securities. Our dataset is limited to the subset of credit institutions. The List of MFIs can be downloaded 
from the European Central Bank website. October 1998 was a test date as the MFI List started in 1999. 
15 The database can be found on the World Bank website or in a CD-ROM attached to the book by Barth et al. (2006).   13 
Finally, we use data (reported in Table 4) on government ownership of banks, drawn by La 
Porta et al. (2002) for 1995 and by Barth et al. (2006) for 2003. The share of total banking assets 
held by state-owned banks in each country is used as a proxy of the government’s stakes in the 
banking  sector  and  therefore  of  its  incentives  to  try  to  influence  (e.g.  through  legislation)  the 
structure  of  the  banking  system.  For  example,  if  government-owned  banks  are  not  maximizing 
profits, as suggested in part of the literature (e.g. La Porta et al., 2002; Sapienza, 2004), branching 
decisions could reflect attempts to establish or consolidate influence in certain geographical areas. 
As our variables span only a limited period of time and are not available in every period, we 
average our observations over our sample period; accordingly, our first dataset is a cross-section of 
120 regional observations.
16 Table 5 provides summary statistics for the regional variables, broken 
down by countries. Data confirm that banking structures in Europe exhibit a significant variability 
not only across but also within countries.
17 The distribution of the ratio across the 120 European 
regions over our sample period goes from 0 to 0.32, implying that in at least one region the average 
number of branches for bank is as small as three. A second dataset of 19,442 observations (with the 
dependent variable being the number of foreign banks for the 147 pairs home region – host region) 




5.1 Barriers and degree of localism in banking systems 
This section presents the results of our empirical exercise on the role of different barriers on our 
index of localism. The idea to be tested is that higher barriers, either due to asymmetric information 
or  to  different  regulatory  regimes,  may  preserve  the  local  nature  of  banking  systems  and  be 
                                                 
16 Data on branches are missing for Greece, Ireland and The Netherlands. Our cross-sectional observations are therefore 
reduced when using the ratio between banks and branches as the dependent variable. 
17 The standard deviation in the number of banks within European countries (i.e. across regions in a country) is, on 
average, greater (61.30) than the standard deviation of national averages across countries (43.85). 
18 We deal exclusively with the determinants of the presence of banks from other European countries in each European 
region of  our  sample  because  this  is  what  our  regional data  allow  for  (i.e. no  banks  from the  Rest  of  World  are 
considered). With regard to this exercise, it should be noted that there is some potential for confusion in the terminology. 
The List of MFIs does not report, as foreign banks, subsidiaries of foreign banks (i.e. national banks controlled by 
foreign shareholders, either banks or other entities), but only branches of foreign banks. However, in line with standard 
reporting practices, only headquarters are reported: in other words, if, say, a French bank should decide to open more 
than one branch in Italy, this would still imply just one record for that French bank in the Italian List of MFIs. This 
induces a potentially significant bias: however, we included a dummy for the capital city to take into account this effect 
and we check how relevant this problem is in Italy, for which we have additional information. It turns out that 72 per 
cent of the foreign banks have only one branch in Italy and another 18 per cent have just two branches.    14 
associated with a higher level of our index. Being based on the weight of local versus outside banks 
in each regional banking system, this index is a reasonable quantity-based measure of integration of 
banking systems within European countries, quite close to measures such as the share of foreign 
banks in a national banking system. As asymmetric information and relationship lending constitute a 
barrier to entry for outside banks, they end up hampering integration.  
Our results support this idea. Table 6 shows the results obtained running both a fractional logit 
model (second column) and a IV estimate (third column). The negative coefficient for the (log) firm 
size and the positive coefficient for the linguistic minority dummy are both strongly significant. 
Regions where firms’ size is smaller and cultural differences matter tend to have a strong degree of 
localism, supporting the idea that these factors may act as barriers to integration. A lower size of 
firms magnifies the role of asymmetric information and the relevance of relationship lending and it 
is,  accordingly,  associated  with  a  higher  ratio  between  banks  and  branches.  Estimates  of 
instrumental variables confirm the results. The effect and the significance of firm size remain stable 
when alternative instruments are included. 
In  a  similar  way,  linguistic  minorities  also  require  local  (i.e.  established  in  that  region) 
banks, as the presence of such minorities aggravates the problems of asymmetric information and 
therefore hampers integration. If we exclude from the sample the Italian region Trentino - Alto 
Adige,  which  has  a  significant  German-speaking  population  and  a  large  number  of  small  local 
banks, the size of the coefficient decreases of about one third, but its significance (at 1 per cent 
level) does not change. 
Moving  to  the  national  variables,  we  find  that  the  government’s  share  is  significantly 
positive, suggesting that a stronger presence of public banks, everything else being equal, raises the 
degree  of  localism  of  banking  systems.  The  picture  is  more  blurred  when  we  come  to  the 
supervisory variables. As we said in the previous paragraph, we consider alternatively three different 
variables; unfortunately, results are not consistent across all the indexes. While sign and significance 
are those expected on the indicators based, respectively, on the entry rules and on the scope of 
allowed activities, the index based on the amplitude of supervisory powers is significant but has the 
wrong sign. This result may reflect the fact that in a prudential supervision framework, supervisory 
powers are not necessarily limiting markets (as suggested, for example, by the value taken by this   15 
index  for  the United  Kingdom
19)  or,  more  likely  in  our  view,  it  could simply  be  linked  to  the 
methodological weakness of our indexes. Actually, although the World Bank database, which they 
are based on, is to our knowledge the most complete attempt to deal with the issue, we are unsure 
about the ability of these indexes (and more generally of a survey designed for more than 150 
countries across the world) to discriminate among European countries. In particular, there is not 
much variance of these indexes across EU countries (their average coefficient of variation is around 
0.2). The sum of the three different indexes (after a proper normalization) produces an index that 
shows almost no variability across Europe.  
 
5.2 Number of foreign banks 
The number of observations for all possible pairs host region – home region is 19,442 (Table 
7). Not surprisingly, zeros are largely predominant (but we still have 226 non-zero observations). 
Results applying the Zero Inflated Poisson model are presented in Table 8. The lower panel (logit 
model) shows the determinants of the decision by foreign banks not to locate in a region (i.e. empty 
cells); the upper panel (Poisson model) shows the determinants of the number of foreign banks 
(when observations are non-zero). We use a slightly different set of covariates respectively in the 
logit and in the Poisson model, excluding from the latter the dummy for the capital region and the 
government’s share. 
In the logit model, localization decisions are affected positively
20 by population and GDP per 
capita of the host region and by the GDP per capita of the home region. Geographical contiguity 
also seems to matter as the dummy for neighbouring regions is strongly significant. The same holds 
for bilateral trade relationships. Capital cities also significantly lure foreign branches. 
Consistently  with  the idea  that small  firms  may  be  less  transparent  to outsiders,  foreign 
banks also tend to avoid, ceteris paribus, regions where the average size of firms is small. This 
confirms our previous findings on the role of  asymmetric information. Finally, entry regulation 
affects  branching  decisions  negatively  (albeit  only  at  a  10  per  cent  confidence  level)  while 
government’s share in the banking system affects these decisions positively, but counter-intuitively, 
perhaps suggesting that the systems present with more opportunities for foreign banks. 
                                                 
19  Indeed,  on  the  basis  of  a  recent  survey  by  the  Committee  of  European  Banking  Supervisors  (CEBS,  2005), 
supervision is no longer perceived as a major obstacle to cross-border consolidation. 
20 I.e. the coefficients are negative.    16 
In the Poisson model, regional income per capita, in both the host and the home country, 
affects the number of foreign banks positively and the same holds for population and bilateral trade. 
Tighter regulation lowers the number of foreign banks while firms’ size is not significant. As this 
regression explains the number of banks in each region where foreign branches are located rather 
than the decision to locate there and it is run with 226 observations vis-à-vis the more than 19,000 
used in the logit regression, we do not see the result as a significant  drawback. IV regressions 
broadly confirm these results.  
 
6. Summing up 
In this paper, we investigate the role of barriers in the European credit markets using an indicator 
of the degree of localism of regional banking systems and the number of foreign branches in each 
European region. We argue that this regional analysis may indeed help to understand better the role 
of  the  factors  that  are  frequently  mentioned  as  hindering  integration  in  the  EU  retail  banking 
markets, namely information asymmetries - originated by linguistic and cultural differences and by 
the underlying economic structure - and national supervision practices and corporate governance 
rules. Econometric results support the idea that different languages, an economic structure made of 
smaller firms and the weight of the government in the banking system favour, ceteris paribus, a 
more  local  character  of  a  regional  banking  system.  Broadly  in  line  with  these  findings,  the 
complementary exercise on cross-border branching shows that foreign banks tend to avoid regions 
where the average size of firms is small.   17 
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 Table 1 
Countries and regions included in our sample 
 
 
Countries N. Regions Countries N. Regions Countries N. Regions
AT11 Burgenland GR11 Anat. Makedonia, Thraki NL11 Groningen
AT12 Niederösterreich GR12 Kentriki Makedonia NL12 Friesland
AT13 Wien GR13 Dytiki Makedonia NL13 Drenthe
AT21 Kärnten GR14 Thessalia NL21 Overijssel
AT22 Steiermark GR21 Ipeiros NL22 Gelderland
AT31 Oberösterreich GR22 Ionia Nisia NL23 Flevoland
AT32 Salzburg GR23 Dytiki Ellada NL31 Utrecht
AT33 Tirol GR24 Sterea Ellada NL32 Noord-Holland
AT34 Vorarlberg GR25 Peloponnisos NL33 Zuid-Holland
BE1 R. de Bruxelles Hoof. Gewest GR3 Attiki NL34 Zeeland
BE21 Prov. Antwerpen GR41 Voreio Aigaio NL41 Noord-Brabant
BE22 Prov. Limburg (B) GR42 Notio Aigaio NL42 Limburg (NL)
BE23 Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen GR43 Kriti PT11 Norte
BE24 Prov. Vlaams Brabant DE1 Baden-Württemberg PT15 Algarve
BE25 Prov. West-Vlaanderen DE2 Bayern PT16Centro
BE31 Prov. Brabant Wallon DE3 Berlin PT17Lisboa
BE32 Prov. Hainaut DE4 Brandenburg PT18Alentejo
BE33 Prov. Liège DE5 Bremen PT2 R. Autónoma dos Açores
BE34 Prov. Luxembourg (B) DE6 Hamburg PT3 R. Autónoma da Madeira
BE35 Prov. Namur DE7 Hessen ES11 Galicia
Danmark 1 DE8 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern ES12 Principado de Asturias
FI13 Itä-Suomi DE9 Niedersachsen ES13 Cantabria
FI18 Etelä-Suomi-South DEA Nordrhein-Westfalen ES21 Pais Vasco
FI19 Länsi-Suomi-West DEB Rheinland-Pfalz ES22 Com. Foral de Navarra
FI1a Pohjois-Suomi DEC Saarland ES23 La Rioja
FI2 Åland DED Sachsen ES24 Aragón
FR1 Île de France DEE Sachsen-Anhalt ES3 Comunidad de Madrid
FR21 Champagne-Ardenne DEF Schleswig-Holstein ES41 Castilla y León
FR22 Picardie DEG Thüringen ES42 Castilla-la Mancha
FR23 Haute-Normandie IE01 Border, Midlands, Western ES43 Extremadura
FR24 Centre IE02 Southern and Eastern ES51 Cataluña
FR25 Basse-Normandie ITC1 Piemonte ES52 Comunidad Valenciana
FR26 Bourgogne ITC2 Valle d'Aosta ES53 Illes Balears
FR3 Nord - Pas-de-Calais ITC3 Liguria ES61 Andalucia
FR41 Lorraine ITC4 Lombardia ES62 Región de Murcia
FR42 Alsace ITD1 Trentino-Alto Adige ES7 Canarias (ES)
FR43 Franche-Comté ITD3 Veneto UKC North East
FR51 Pays de la Loire ITD4 Friuli-Venezia Giulia UKD North West 
FR52 Bretagne ITD5 Emilia-Romagna UKE Yorkshire and The Humber
FR53 Poitou-Charentes ITE1 Toscana UKF East Midlands
FR61 Aquitaine ITE2 Umbria UKG West Midlands
FR62 Midi-Pyrénées ITE3 Marche UKH Eastern
FR63 Limousin ITE4 Lazio UKI London
FR71 Rhône-Alpes ITF1 Abruzzo UKJ South East
FR72 Auvergne ITF2 Molise UKK South West
FR81 Languedoc-Roussillon ITF3 Campania UKL Wales
FR82 Prov.-Alpes-Côte d'Azur ITF4 Puglia UKM Scotland
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Table 2 
Linguistic and cultural minorities 
in the EU countries in our sample 
 
Regional Code  Region 
 AT11   Burgenland 
 AT21   Kärnten 
 DE4   Brandenburg 
 DED   Sachsen 
 ITC2   Val d’Aosta/Vallée d'Aoste 
 ITD1   Trentino Alto-Adige 
 ITD4   Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
 ES11   Galicia 
 ES21   Pais Vasco 
 ES51   Cataluña 
 ES52   Comunidad Valenciana 
 UKL    Wales 
 UKM   Scotland 
 UKN   Northern Ireland 
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Table 3 
Supervision restrictiveness indexes 










   Austria 11 8 13
   Belgium 13 8 10
   Denmark 14 8 9
   Finland 12 6 6
   France 9 6 7
   Germany 11 7 9
   Greece 12 7 12
   Ireland 11 0 11
   Italy 15 8 7
   Netherlands 10 8 5
   Portugal 14 7 14
   Spain 10 8 9
   United Kingdom 7 8 11  
  Source: Barth et al. (2006).  
 
 
Table 4  
Percentage of bank assets of government-owned banks 
in the EU countries in our sample 
Country 1995 2003
   Austria 50.36 0.00
   Belgium 27.56 0.00
   Denmark 8.87 0.00
   Finland 30.65 0.00
   France 17.26 0.00
   Germany 36.36 42.20
   Greece 77.82 22.80
   Ireland 4.48 0.00
   Italy 35.95 10.00
   Netherlands 9.20 3.90
   Portugal 25.66 22.80
   Spain 1.98 0.00
   UK 0.00 0.00
 
      Sources: La Porta et al. (2002) and Barth et al. (2006). 
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Table 5a 
Summary statistics for the within-country regional variables in our dataset  
 






Population Farmers Area km2 Students
   N. regions 9 9 9 9 9.0 9 9 9 9
   mean 93.6 594.0 0.17 8.66 22.7 896.8 3.07 9,318 186.42
   min 34.0 244.5 0.12 7.23 15.2 276.3 1.80 415 106.83
   max 153.0 1,202.2 0.25 11.66 32.4 1,598.7 6.63 19,173 377.35
   sd 42.0 324.7 0.04 1.37 5.0 527.4 1.79 6,354 113.78
   p25 68.6 364.8 0.14 7.53 19.7 511.3 1.80 3,966 106.83
   p50 92.8 551.3 0.16 8.68 22.3 662.2 2.68 9,533 155.68
   p75 118.4 707.3 0.18 9.10 24.2 1,379.8 3.97 12,648 273.32
   N. regions 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
   mean 10.3 567.0 0.02 5.74 21.3 925.7 2.62 2,774 237.50
   min 0.0 111.5 0.00 4.44 14.5 243.3 0.40 161 68.04
   max 71.4 1,130.0 0.12 7.34 45.2 1,636.5 7.52 4,440 391.53
   sd 21.3 336.3 0.03 0.97 8.5 440.0 2.32 1,272 108.52
   p25 0.2 154.0 0.00 4.79 16.1 438.5 0.70 2,106 120.55
   p50 2.6 566.0 0.01 5.51 19.1 1,005.7 1.30 2,982 260.12
   p75 7.0 858.0 0.01 6.75 22.3 1,283.2 4.35 3,786 333.95
   N. regions 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
   mean 193.8 2316.3 0.084 7.972 29.11 5280.2 48.3 43094 1258.43
   Austria
   Belgium
   Denmark
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Table 5b 
(continued) 






Population Farmers Area km2 Students
   N. regions 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
   mean 72.8 343.9 0.20 5.00 22.5 1,027.5 7.75 67,629 259.06
   min 3.0 31.0 0.10 3.42 13.0 25.3 0.35 1,527 513.30
   max 145.4 615.5 0.32 5.77 34.3 2,033.8 11.68 128,294 505.91
   sd 55.5 246.7 0.09 1.10 8.8 860.5 4.63 46,361 226.65
   p25 46.4 187.0 0.14 4.25 16.2 564.2 6.18 52,636 129.12
   p50 60.0 325.7 0.18 5.77 20.7 698.0 9.92 70,294 163.55
   p75 109.2 560.5 0.26 5.77 28.5 1,816.0 10.63 85,395 491.56
   N. regions 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
   mean 45.0 1,150.9 0.02 5.87 19.4 2,657.2 15.85 24,726 655.63
   min 4.2 360.0 0.01 2.53 15.8 260.8 1.85 8,280 54.32
   max 607.6 4,433.0 0.14 7.90 33.1 11,012.3 39.28 45,348 2,857.53
   sd 126.2 893.0 0.03 1.47 3.4 2,245.5 9.44 11,212 589.62
   p25 8.6 613.0 0.01 4.91 17.8 1,421.0 7.48 16,202 348.23
   p50 17.2 1,026.0 0.02 6.04 18.8 2,067.7 14.96 25,708 500.92
   p75 27.8 1,359.0 0.02 6.95 19.6 2,895.3 19.77 31,582 724.79
   N. regions 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
   mean 158.3 3,898.4 0.04 10.67 22.7 5,120.7 30.45 22,314 1,054.44
   min 18.0 320.3 0.01 8.03 14.9 673.8 1.12 404 141.50
   max 592.2 11,658.2 0.10 16.24 40.0 17,933.0 63.65 70,548 3,857.91
   sd 181.9 3,750.4 0.02 2.01 6.9 4,732.3 20.09 18,687 1,005.85
   p25 34.0 1,092.3 0.02 9.54 15.7 2,147.5 13.84 9,171 440.59
   p50 62.8 1,931.0 0.04 10.28 21.8 3,090.6 34.89 20,147 629.91
   p75 269.2 6,055.7 0.05 11.11 26.8 6,920.8 47.52 31,778 1,396.30
   Finland
   France
   Germany










Population Farmers Area km2 Students
   N. regions 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
   mean 4.6 n.a n.a 13.68 9.7 807.4 7.31 10,125 151.38
   min 0.0 n.a n.a 5.50 6.9 184.3 1.45 2,307 30.51
   max 45.0 n.a n.a 23.58 12.3 3,455.7 17.15 18,811 739.62
   sd 12.2 n.a n.a 4.90 1.6 896.1 5.03 5,285 195.55
   p25 0.8 n.a n.a 11.11 8.4 302.7 2.80 5,286 62.39
   p50 1.0 n.a n.a 13.90 9.7 561.8 7.25 9,452 87.71
   p75 2.0 n.a n.a 16.29 10.4 735.3 10.67 14,158 121.57
   N. regions 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
   mean 41.2 n.a n.a 12.76 18.7 1,840.8 12.27 35,143 493.40
   min 0.0 n.a n.a 12.02 15.2 964.5 7.83 26,527 255.77
   max 82.4 n.a n.a 13.50 22.2 2,717.2 16.70 43,758 731.02
   sd 58.3 n.a n.a 1.04 4.9 1,239.3 6.27 12,184 336.05
   p25 0.0 n.a n.a 12.02 15.2 964.5 7.83 26,527 255.77
   p50 41.2 n.a n.a 12.76 18.7 1,840.8 12.67 35,143 493.40
   p75 82.4 n.a n.a 13.50 22.2 2,717.2 16.70 43,758 731.02
   N. regions 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
   mean 42.1 1,383.0 0.03 3.34 17.5 2,874.4 29.00 15,066 509.30
   min 3.4 89.3 0.01 2.12 10.7 119.5 6.33 3,264 14.46
   max 178.8 5,322.5 0.14 4.40 24.0 8,979.7 12.23 25,707 1,393.24
   sd 43.8 1,265.2 0.03 0.65 4.6 2,317.1 33.40 7,412 420.26
   p25 10.7 500.4 0.02 2.82 13.0 1,054.3 6.33 9,075 171.46
   p50 29.2 885.1 0.03 3.36 18.3 1,863.8 12.23 14,344 370.67
   p75 56.5 2,060.2 0.03 3.96 21.0 4,377.1 34.42 22,559 755.13
   Greece
   Ireland
   Italy
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Table 5d 
(continued) 






Population Farmers Area km2 Students
   N. regions 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
   mean 45.0 n.a n.a 8.90 21.4 1,302.3 6.70 2,824 270.40
   min 9.2 n.a n.a 7.76 16.7 289.0 1.75 1,364 65.80
   max 131.4 n.a n.a 9.88 27.7 3,356.5 24.60 4,989 73.97
   sd 36.2 n.a n.a 0.73 3.6 988.5 6.58 1,190 212.86
   p25 16.8 n.a n.a 8.28 18.8 510.8 2.71 1,979 109.98
   p50 39.8 n.a n.a 8.97 19.8 1,073.7 4.08 2,656 201.39
   p75 61.5 n.a n.a 9.43 24.7 2,102.7 10.12 3,349 402.04
   N. regions 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
   mean 29.7 735.5 0.04 5.39 9.4 1,442.4 13.17 13,129 n.a
   min 0.0 141.7 0.00 3.71 7.3 238.5 3.57 779 n.a
   max 72.6 1,852.0 0.09 6.26 11.5 3,579.8 26.85 26,931 n.a
   sd 27.0 718.2 0.03 0.86 1.4 1,528.6 9.86 10,838 n.a
   p25 8.4 142.5 0.03 4.89 8.1 247.5 5.15 2,330 n.a
   p50 22.8 300.0 0.03 5.59 9.8 480.5 7.28 11,931 n.a
   p75 53.2 1,589.3 0.08 6.11 10.1 3,552.2 22.55 23,668 n.a
   N. regions 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
   mean 22.1 2,260.9 0.01 4.42 13.2 2,309.7 24.62 29,692 520.69
   min 1.0 415.7 0.00 3.37 8.4 261.5 2.52 5,014 52.74
   max 171.2 7,199.8 0.04 5.71 17.6 7,140.7 155.62 94,193 1,787.13
   sd 40.6 1,953.0 0.01 0.66 2.7 2,058.4 36.25 30,418 487.61
   p25 4.0 990.0 0.00 3.87 11.1 1,066.3 4.10 7,261 212.31
   p50 7.8 1,648.2 0.00 4.40 12.7 1,595.0 15.95 11,317 369.56
   p75 18.8 2,924.2 0.01 4.99 15.9 2,715.0 25.88 41,602 563.01
   Portugal
   Spain
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Table 5e 
(continued) 






Population Farmers Area km2 Students
   N. regions 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
   mean 37.9 1,252.9 0.02 10.66 19.4 4,920.1 26.03 20,318 1,290.44
   min 4.8 321.8 0.01 9.32 15.9 1,677.2 3.47 1,584 458.23
   max 315.8 3,019.2 0.10 12.50 29.5 7,955.3 47.83 78,132 2,042.43
   sd 87.7 829.0 0.03 1.07 3.7 1,880.0 13.90 19,119 492.10
   p25 8.2 578.2 0.01 9.65 17.1 3,542.3 17.98 13,582 935.99
   p50 12.3 1,149.6 0.01 10.80 18.6 5,081.9 24.12 15,597 1,223.86
   p75 17.1 1,505.1 0.02 11.52 20.3 6,113.9 39.56 19,944 1,696.82
   United Kingdom
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Table 6 
Determinants of the degree of localism (ratio banks/branches) at regional level 
Coefficients and robust standard errors (in italics) of, respectively, a fractional logit and an Instrumental Variable (IV) 
estimation. Standard errors in the fractional logit regression are also corrected for country clusters. The dependent 
variable is an indicator of the degree of localism of the regional banking systems: the ratio between total banks and total 
branches  in  each  region,  which  is  bounded  between  0  and  1  by  construction.  Apart  self-explanatory  covariates, 
Linguistic and cultural minorities are detailed in Table 2; Farmers is the regional share of employees in agriculture; 
Capital is  a  dummy  for  the region of  country  capital;  Entry  into banking  requirements is  an index  measuring the 
restrictiveness of rules applied to entry (Table 3); Government-owned banks '95 is the share of total bank assets held by 
state-owned banks in 1995 (Table 4). ***, **, * denote, respectively, statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level. 
Regressors  Fractional 
logit model  IV model 
             
GDP per capita (log)  0.679  **  0.086  *** 
   0.290     0.024     
Population (log)  0.590  **  0.023  *** 
   0.236     0.009     
Firms' size (log)  -0.685  **  -0.136  *** 
   0.335     0.044     
Linguistic and cultural minorities  0.664  ***  0.025  ** 
   0.192     0.011     
Farmers (log)  -0.544  ***  -0.016  ** 
   0.174     0.007     
Capital  -0.365     -0.023    
   0.343     0.019     
Students/population  13.186  ***  0.704  *** 
   3.856     0.185     
Entry into banking requirements  1.016  ***  0.052  *** 
   0.159     0.012     
Government-owned banks ‘95  0.012  *  0.003  *** 
   0.007     0.000     
Constant  -17.221  ***  -0.664  *** 
   1.226     0.115     
Country dummies            
 Number of observations  113   112  
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Table 7 
 
Observations in the exercise on number of foreign banks 
for all possible cross-border pairs host region – home region 
 






Austria  9  138  1,242 
Belgium  11  136  1,496 
Denmark  1  146  146 
Finland  5  142  710 
France  22  125  2,750 
Germany  16  131  2,096 
Greece  13  134  1,742 
Ireland  2  145  290 
Italy  20  127  2,540 
Netherlands  12  135  1,620 
Portugal  7  140  980 
Spain  17  130  2,210 
UK  12  135  1,620 
Total  147  1,764  19,442 
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Table 8 
Determinants of the number of foreign banks at regional level 
Coefficients  and  robust  standard  errors  (in  italics)  of  a  Zero  Inflated  Poisson  estimation.  Standard  errors  are  also 
corrected for country clusters. Dependent variable: number of foreign banks in each cross-border pair host region – 
home region. The upper panel shows the results of the Poisson model (for non-zero observations). The lower panel 
reports the results of the inflation model = logit. Country dummies are included for both the upper and the lower panel 
regressions. Covariates are split up on the base of the characteristics of host and home regions and their links. Apart 
from self-explanatory regressors, Capital is a dummy for the region of country capital; Government-owned banks '95 is 
the share of total bank assets held by state-owned banks in 1995 (Table 4); Trade is the trade flows between each pair of 
countries; Farmers is the regional share of employees in agriculture; Official supervisory power is an index measuring 
general supervisory powers (Table 3); Trust inter countries is a measure of the reciprocal trust between the citizens of 




region  Regressors  Coef.  Robust 
Std. Err. 
 Population (log)  0.444   0.200  **  
 GDP per capita (log)  3.291   1.134  *** 
 Firms’ size (log)  -1.63   1.61    
host 
 Entry regulation  -0.345   0.045  *** 
home   GDP per capita (log)  3.82   0.905  *** 
 Trade (log)  0.433   0.141  *** 
 Common language  -0.283   0.203     inter-countries 
 Common border regions  -0.055   0.331    
    Constant  -25.64   5.79  *** 
Inflate   
 Firms' size (log)  -3.883   1.49  ***  
 Population (log)  -1.404   0.375  *** 
 GDP per capita (log)  -3.179   1.263  ***  
 Capital  -1.893   0.519  *** 
 Entry regulation  0.216   0.123  * 
host 
 Government share  -0.085   0.020  ***  
home   GDP per capita (log)  -3.934   1.441  *** 
 Trust inter countries  -0.400   0.73    
 Common language  -0.580   0.509    
 Trade (log)  -1.129   0.245  *** 
inter-countries 
 Common border regions  -11.27   3.64  *** 
    Constant  57.95   7.46  *** 
 Number of observations  19,442 
 Non-zero observations  226 
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